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ABSTRACT 
 
MARK G. MAFFETT: Financial Reporting Opacity and Informed Trading by International 
Institutional Investors 
(Under the direction of Mark H. Lang) 
 
Using cross-country data on trading by international mutual funds, I find that firms with 
more opaque information environments, as captured by firm- and country-level measures of 
the availability of financial reporting information, experience more privately-informed 
trading by institutional investors. The association between firm-level opacity and informed 
trading is most pronounced where country-level disclosure infrastructures are less developed 
and for those investors for whom the incentives and opportunities to acquire private 
information are greatest. A difference-in-differences analysis of returns earned by institutions 
across opaque and transparent firms suggests these results are economically significant.  
 
iii 
 
To Jackie and Maya
iv 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 
This paper has benefited tremendously from the guidance and support of my dissertation 
committee members: Mark Lang (advisor), Jeff Abarbanell, Robert Bushman, Wayne 
Landsman and Christian Lundblad. I am also grateful for helpful comments from S.P. 
Kothari (editor), Brian Bushee (JAE discussant), an anonymous reviewer, Dan Amiram, 
Mary Barth, John Gallemore, Joseph Gerakos, John Hand, Justin Hopkins, Susan Hughes, 
Andrew Karolyi, Christian Leuz, Tom Lys, Ed Maydew, Katie McDermott, Derrald Stice, 
Robert Verrecchia and seminar participants at the 2011 Journal of Accounting & Economics 
Conference, the 2011 American Accounting Association Annual Meeting, the University of 
North Carolina at Chapel Hill and Wake Forest University. I gratefully acknowledge funding 
from the Deloitte Foundation, the State Farm Companies Foundation and the AAA/Grant 
Thornton Doctoral Dissertation Award.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................. vi 
 
FINANCIAL REPORTING OPACITY AND INFORMED TRADING BY 
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS .......................................................1 
 
Introduction ..........................................................................................................................1 
 
Prior Literature .....................................................................................................................5 
 
Empirical Predictions ...........................................................................................................8 
 
Research Design .................................................................................................................10 
 
Sample and Results ............................................................................................................18 
 
Conclusion .........................................................................................................................35 
 
Appendix A. Timeline for Variable Measurement ............................................................49 
 
Appendix B. Variable Definitions .....................................................................................50 
 
References ..........................................................................................................................52 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vi 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
 
Table 
 
1. Breakdown of the Sample By Country ...............................................................38 
 
2. Descriptive Statistics ...........................................................................................39 
 
3. Correlation Matrices ...........................................................................................40 
 
4. Informed Trading by Institutions and Firm-Level Opacity ................................41 
 
5. Informed Trading by Institutions and Country-Level Opacity ...........................42 
 
6. Additional Analyses and Robustness Tests ........................................................43 
 
7. Firm- and Country-Level Opacity Interactions ...................................................44 
8. Informed Trading and Opacity by Institutional Type .........................................45 
9. Difference-in-Differences Returns Tests ............................................................48 
  
   
 
 
1. Introduction 
A substantial body of prior research explores whether institutional investors trade 
based on superior information. While many studies show that, on average, institutions 
underperform their appropriate benchmarks [e.g., Carhart (1997)], others suggest that certain 
subsets of institutional investors can consistently forecast future returns [e.g., Yan and Zhang 
(2009)]. However, we know less about how those institutions that can earn excess returns 
actually do and, in particular, whether the transparency of the target firm’s information 
environment is an important determinant of the extent and profitability of their informed 
trades. In this paper, I address this question directly and explore how institutional investors 
create private informational advantages by examining the relation between informed 
institutional trading, as captured by a positive association between changes in holdings and 
future returns, and the opacity of firms’ public financial reporting.1 To provide a deeper 
understanding of this relation, I also investigate where and for whom an opaque financial 
reporting environment provides the greatest benefit for private information-based trading.2
                                                            
1 Throughout the paper, I assume a positive association between changes in institutional holdings and future 
returns, controlling for risk and prior performance, is indicative of informed trading and frequently refer to it as 
such. 
 
2 Throughout the paper, I follow Bushman et al. (2004) and define opacity as the unavailability of firm-specific 
information to those outside publicly traded firms. For parsimony, I frequently refer to this construct as 
‘opacity’.  
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At a conceptual level, there are compelling reasons to believe the extent of 
institutional investors’ informed trading could be increasing in the opacity of firms’ financial 
reporting. Specifically, although prior literature suggests that financial reporting transparency 
can have significant benefits for the average investor [e.g., Lang and Maffett (2011a)], as 
noted by Verrecchia (1982) and Diamond (1985), less public disclosure can also motivate 
more private information gathering. A greater extent of private information acquisition 
increases information asymmetry and creates the possibility for better-informed investors to 
gain at the expense of others by trading on their information advantages. This suggests that 
certain subsets of investors may actually benefit from more opaque financial reporting. 
Moreover, although private information acquisition is costly and beyond the means of many 
investors, sophisticated investors, such as institutions, likely have significant capital and 
expertise that they can leverage to execute profitable trades based on private information. 
Thus, if having less publicly available information increases the incentive to acquire private 
information, for those users capable of profitably exploiting such information, the opacity of 
firms’ financial reporting is likely to be an important factor in determining the extent of 
informed trade. 
I explore the relation between opacity and institutional informed trading in a three-
phase empirical analysis using a broad sample of cross-country data on trading by 
international mutual funds. First, to establish whether opacity significantly affects the extent 
of informed institutional trade, I examine the relation between firm- and country-level 
financial reporting and the extent to which changes in institutional holdings predict future 
returns. Second, to provide deeper insight into the cross-sectional determinants of the 
association between opacity and informed trade, I examine variation in the relation across 
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varying country-level disclosure regimes and types of institutional investor. Finally, to assess 
the economic significance of these results, I conduct a difference-in-differences analysis.  
In the first analysis, I find that changes in institutional holdings are more positively 
associated with future returns for firms with greater opacity as measured by analyst 
following, forecast accuracy, forecast diversity, auditor choice and discretionary earnings 
smoothing. I also find evidence of more informed trading in firms located in countries with a 
less developed and extensive news media, weaker country-level disclosure and worse 
corporate governance. These results establish that firm- and country-level opacity are 
individually and incrementally important determinants of the extent of institutional informed 
trading. Further, my results also indicate a strong interactive relation between firm- and 
country-level opacity. I find that the association between informed trade and firm-level 
opacity is strongest where the country-level disclosure environment is weakest and 
diminishes significantly in countries with more developed disclosure regulation and 
information dissemination. This result demonstrates that, while an opaque country-level 
disclosure regime appears to complement firm-level opacity and encourage more private 
information-based trading, a more transparent country-level infrastructure provides alternate 
sources of information which may mitigate the effects of poor firm-level disclosure.  
Next, I examine whether the association between opacity and informed trade varies 
based on institutional investor characteristics. I find that firm-level opacity is more strongly 
related to the extent of informed trade for institutions domiciled in the same country as their 
target firms (“local”) relative to institutions domiciled in different countries than their target 
firms (“foreign”) and for institutions with high portfolio turnover (“transient”) relative to 
institutions with low portfolio turnover (“dedicated”). Moreover, splitting local relative to 
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foreign and transient relative to dedicated institutional trading based on the opacity of the 
country-level information environment, I find that the association between firm-level opacity 
and informed trade is strongest among local and transient institutions investing in firms 
domiciled in countries with relatively more opaque infrastructures. These findings indicate 
that firm- and country-level opacity provide the greatest benefit to those investors for whom 
the incentives and opportunities to acquire private information are strongest. 
Finally, I use a difference-in-differences analysis to assess the economic importance 
of my primary findings. I find that the annualized risk-adjusted returns for opaque firms with 
the largest change in institutional holdings are 5.8% larger than those of firms with the 
smallest change. This difference increases to 6.5% when both firm- and country-level opacity 
are considered. The difference in returns across change in holdings groups for transparent 
firms are significantly smaller suggesting that institutions are better at predicting the returns 
of opaque firms. Moreover, I document that these returns are likely to exceed transactions 
costs for most firms in my sample, indicating that some institutions can earn significant gross 
profits from private information-based trading in opaque firms.3
I also conduct an extensive set of additional tests and sensitivity analyses to show my 
results are robust to the inclusion of firm fixed effects, several alternative constructions of 
my primary measure of informed trading and a variety of additional controls for liquidity and 
risk factors found by prior research to be associated with future returns. Results are also 
consistent within the vast majority of sample countries and years.  
 
                                                            
3 These results suggest that institutions’ trades in opaque firms are profitable on a gross basis and exceed one 
measure of transactions costs. However, without a measure of the cost of effort institutions expend acquiring 
private information, it is difficult to determine the profitability of their trades net of all costs. Nevertheless, the 
magnitude of the positive gross return I document suggests that institutions are rewarded for the effort they 
expend investing in opaque stocks.  
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My study makes several contributions to the existing literature. First, my paper 
provides novel evidence that the opacity of a firm’s information environment, at both the 
firm- and country-level, is a statistically and economically significant determinant of the 
extent of informed trading by institutional investors. Second, my paper provides additional 
insight into the relation between opacity and institutional informed trade by demonstrating 
that the extent of informed trading is significantly influenced by interactive relations between 
firm-level financial reporting and: the country-level disclosure regime and investors’ 
incentives and opportunities to acquire private information. Finally, in contrast to the extant 
research on the economic effects of financial reporting, my paper is the first (of which I am 
aware) to provide direct evidence that some classes of sophisticated investors may actually 
benefit from more opaque financial reporting. 
2. Prior Literature  
My primary interest is examining whether the opacity of firms’ financial reporting 
environments is a significant determinant of the extent of informed trading by institutional 
investors. Prior research on institutional informed trading focuses mainly on whether and, to 
a lesser extent, what types of institutions are likely to make profitable trades based on private 
information. We know little about how opacity affects traders’ abilities to earn these excess 
returns. The prior literature examining the economic effects of financial reporting in equity 
markets focuses on the ways in which the average investor benefits from a richer 
information environment. There is, to my knowledge, no direct research on the potential for 
sophisticated arm’s length investors, such as institutions, to benefit from financial reporting 
opacity. Nonetheless, several streams of literature provide economic background and help 
motivate the predictions of my study.  
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The first related literature examines whether institutional investors possess superior 
information about firms’ future performance. For example, Ali et al. (2004) finds a positive 
association between changes in aggregate institutional ownership and abnormal returns at the 
time of the subsequent earnings announcement, consistent with some institutions making 
informed trades. Ke and Petroni (2004) finds an association between changes in aggregate 
institutional ownership and breaks in strings of quarterly earnings growth. My paper differs 
from this literature because it focuses not on whether institutions are superiorly informed, but 
rather on how the opacity of a firm’s information environment affects the extent of informed 
trade. Further, unlike prior papers in the literature, my paper provides additional insight into 
how interactive relations between firm-level financial reporting opacity and the country-level 
disclosure regime and investors’ incentives and opportunities to acquire private information 
affect the extent of institutional informed trading. 
A second related literature examines how regulations intended to limit the selective 
disclosure of nonpublic information affect insider trading. For example, Ke et al. (2008) finds 
that selling prior to breaks in strings of consecutive earnings increases by investors with 
conference call access to management decreased following the implementation of Regulation 
FD. Ke et al. (2008) attributes this finding to a decrease in privileged access to management. 
My paper differs from this literature because it focuses on how firms’ public disclosures 
affect the extent of informed trading rather than on the effects of regulating access to inside 
information.  
The third related literature examines whether characteristics of the institutions 
themselves explain the extent of profitable private information-based trading. Bushee and 
Goodman (2007) shows informed trading by institutions is most likely to take place when 
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institutions hold large positions in particular firms, when the institution itself is large, and 
when the institution has more lax fiscal responsibilities. Baik et al. (2010) shows, in the U.S., 
informed trading is concentrated primarily among local (in terms of geographic proximity) 
institutions. Yan and Zhang (2009) argues that the positive relation between institutional 
ownership and future stock returns documented in Gompers and Metrick (2001) is driven by 
short-term investment horizon investors. My study focuses instead on attributes of the target 
firms and complements this literature by demonstrating that an opaque financial reporting 
environment benefits most those investors with the greatest abilities, incentives and 
opportunities to exploit private information. 
The final stream of related research examines the association between firms’ 
information environments and information asymmetry. Using a sample of U.S. firms, Brown 
and Hillegeist (2007) demonstrates that higher AIMR transparency scores are associated with 
lower values of the Easley et al. (2002) probability of informed trade measure, PIN. 
Internationally, Leuz and Verrecchia (2000), Daske et al. (2008), Lang et al. (2011) and 
others show that greater firm-level financial reporting transparency is associated with lower 
bid-ask spreads and higher liquidity. Although these findings are informative, a negative 
association between transparency and information asymmetry does not necessarily imply that 
some investors might actually benefit from less public disclosure. I show that certain subsets 
of institutional investors may be able to exploit opacity to create a tradable information 
advantage. Further, these studies offer little insight into the identity and characteristics of the 
superiorly informed parties. My paper uses data at the investor level, as well as the firm 
level, to provide direct evidence that financial reporting opacity is associated with the 
informational advantages of sophisticated investors.  
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3. Empirical Predictions 
Although I do not view it as a test of a particular theory, my analysis is motivated by 
the intuition underlying papers such as Verrecchia (1982) and Diamond (1985), which 
theoretically model how public disclosure affects incentives to acquire private information. A 
common theme is that the amount of costly private information investors choose to acquire is 
decreasing in the amount of information firms disclose publicly. Building on this prior work, 
I make four specific empirical predictions. The first addresses whether financial reporting 
opacity is a significant determinant of the extent of informed trading, the remaining three 
focus on where and for whom an opaque information environment is likely to provide the 
greatest benefit for private information-based trading. Together, these predictions, and the 
empirical analyses thereof, are intended to provide an in-depth assessment of the relation 
between financial reporting opacity and institutional investors’ ability to acquire and exploit 
informational advantages.  
Kim and Verrecchia (1997) shows that an investor’s demand for a stock is a function 
of the precision of her private information. In the Kim and Verrecchia (1997) model, 
investors with more precise information prior to an anticipated public announcement take 
positions before the disclosure occurs and make trades that are positively associated with 
future returns. Coupled with the Verrecchia (1982) and Diamond (1985) theories, which 
suggest that higher opacity may increase the profitability of informed trading, these 
arguments imply that having a more opaque information environment creates a greater 
incentive for investors to acquire private information in advance of future information 
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releases. Trades based on such private information create a positive correlation between 
changes in holdings and future performance.4
Despite the incentives created by the absence of public disclosure, acquiring private 
information is costly. A positive correlation between changes in holdings and future returns 
arises only if the benefits of exploiting private information exceed the costs of acquisition. I 
expect that in the face of scant publicly available information, for investors with significant 
expertise and access to resources, the benefits of informed trade are likely to outweigh the 
costs. My first empirical prediction is that the magnitude of the positive association between 
changes in institutional holdings and future returns is increasing in the opacity of firms’ 
financial reporting.  
  
Prior research suggests that the implications of firm-level opacity vary based on the 
quality of the disclosure environment in the country where the firm is domiciled [e.g., Lang 
and Maffett (2011b)]. While weak country-level disclosure regulations may further increase 
opacity and thus the potential benefit of private information acquisition, a more developed 
country-level information dissemination infrastructure, such as, for example, an expansive 
news media, may serve as a substitute for limited firm-level information. My second 
empirical prediction is that the association between institutional informed trade and firm-
level opacity is increasing in the opacity of the country-level disclosure environment. 
                                                            
4 A reasonable question is why uninformed investors are willing to purchase opaque stocks knowing they may 
face informed trading. Kyle (1985) argues that traders price protect by demanding higher returns to hold assets 
with greater information risk and thus, even with asymmetric information, may optimally include such assets in 
their portfolios. Further, assuming traders cannot directly observe whether the counter-party is informed, they 
do not know whether they are trading against an informed party, only that the information risk is high. 
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Even among institutional investors, it is unlikely that the ability to acquire and 
profitably exploit private information is uniformly distributed. Prior research, as discussed in 
Section 2, indicates that informed trade is most prevalent among (or limited to) those 
institutions with the greatest ability to acquire private information. Models such as Dumas et 
al. (2011) suggest local investors are better positioned to acquire private information than 
foreign investors and thus are most likely to benefit from opacity. Empirically, Leuz et al. 
(2010) find that foreign investors invest less in firms that reside in countries with weak 
governance and opaque financial reporting. Leuz et al. (2010) attribute this finding to higher 
information asymmetry and monitoring costs faced by foreign investors. My third empirical 
prediction is that the relation between informed trade and opacity is stronger for local relative 
to foreign institutions. 
Finally, Yan and Zhang (2009) finds that the positive relation between institutional 
ownership and future stock returns documented in Gompers and Metrick (2001) is driven by 
short-term investors and argues that this finding is consistent with these investors being 
better informed and trading more frequently to exploit their informational advantages. This 
suggests short-term investors may more actively seek to acquire private information. As 
discussed previously, such information is likely both more prevalent and more profitable in 
opaque information environments. My fourth empirical prediction is that the relation between 
informed trade and opacity is stronger for transient relative to dedicated institutional 
investors.  
4. Research Design 
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To test my empirical predictions, I estimate a series of pooled OLS regressions of the 
following general form:  
 
, 0 1 , 1
2 , 1 ,
  
  
i t i t
i t i t
Informed Trade Control Variables
Opacity Characteristics Fixed Effects
α β
β ε
−
−
= +
+ + +
 (1)  
Informed Trade is the average level of informed trading by all institutions investing in firm i 
in year t. I describe the calculation of Informed Trade in detail, along with the control 
variables and opacity characteristics, in the following sections. To mitigate concerns about 
endogeneity, I measure each of the control variables and opacity characteristics with a lag. In 
analyses where the variables of interest are measured at the firm level (country level), I 
cluster standard errors at the firm level (country level) to account for possible correlation in 
residuals. To reduce the influence of extreme observations, I winsorize all continuous non-
logarithmic variables at the 2.5% level, unless otherwise noted. 
4.1 Measuring informed trading by institutional investors  
Kim and Verrecchia (1997) shows that pre-announcement trades made by investors 
with private information are positively associated with future changes in firm value. 
According to this argument, a positive association between changes in ownership and 
subsequent stock returns provides evidence of informed trading. Drawing on this theoretical 
motivation, an extensive empirical literature uses the beta coefficient from a regression of 
future returns on changes in institutional holdings as a basis for assessing the extent of 
informed trading [e.g., Ali et al. (2004); Yan and Zhang (2009)].5
                                                            
5 A potential disadvantage of this measure of informed trading is that prices may impound investors’ private 
information immediately at the time of the trade (or shortly thereafter during the reporting period over which 
changes in holdings are measured) rather than over the subsequent 90 days. However, there are several reasons 
to expect that prices will not fully reveal informed investors’ private information immediately. First, if prices 
 I follow this prior 
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theoretical and empirical literature in constructing my measure of informed trade.6
Specifically, I estimate the extent of informed institutional trading by firm-year using 
regressions of the following form:  
 I also 
include controls for prior and contemporaneous returns when estimating the extent of 
informed trade. Although these variables are unlikely to be correlated with future returns in 
an efficient market, because prior literature finds that institutions follow positive feedback 
trading strategies and exert price pressure on returns, they are likely to be correlated with 
changes in institutional holdings [e.g., Sias et al. (2006)]. Prior research suggests including 
such variables on the right-hand side to control for measurement error in the independent 
variable of interest [e.g., Collins et al. (1994)].  
 , , , , ,, 90 0 1 2 , 1 90 3j i t i t j i ti t i tABHR IH ABHR ABHRα β β β ε+ − −= + ∆ + + +  (2)  
ABHR is the risk-adjusted buy-and-hold return for firm i less the buy-and-hold return for the 
market in firm i’s country of domicile.7 IH∆ is the change in percent of total shares held by 
institution j in firm i from time t-1 to t.8
                                                                                                                                                                                        
incorporated investors’ private information immediately, gains from these trades would be significantly 
reduced. For this reason, informed investors have a strong incentive to break-up or otherwise disguise their 
trades to minimize price impact [Bushee and Goodman (2007)]. In support of this argument, Campbell et al. 
(2004) find that institutions trade in very small lot sizes. Second, speculating based on private information is 
risky giving risk adverse investors an incentive to delay their profit realization until their private information is 
publicly revealed.  
 I require at least 10 observations to estimate the 
 
6 I model future returns as a function of changes in institutional holdings so that information unrelated to 
informed trading that affects future returns is included in the error term of Equation (2). If I instead estimate 
changes in holdings as a function of future returns, results throughout the paper are very similar.  
 
7 I calculate market buy-and-hold returns within sample using all available firms in a particular country. I 
require at least 10 firms per country over the return accumulation period (t to t+90). 
 
8 Institutional holdings reporting intervals range from 3-6 months and, while there is some clustering of 
reporting around calendar-quarter-end dates (14% of the institutions report in March, 20% in June, 14% in 
September and 23% in December), a significant portion of the funds report during the other months of the year. 
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regression for each firm-year. I calculate firm and market buy-and-hold returns over three 
distinct windows: 1) over the 90-calendar-day window preceding the institutional holdings 
reporting period, t-1-90; 2) over the institutional holdings reporting period, t; and 3) over the 
90-calendar-day window following the institutional holdings reporting period, t+90. Before 
estimating Equation (2), I risk-adjust returns following the approach in Pincus et al. (2007) 
which is motivated by the variables shown in Fama and French (1998) to be associated with 
future abnormal returns in an international context. As suggested by Sias et al. (2006), I also 
include prior year returns to control for momentum. Specifically, I calculate risk-adjusted 
returns by regressing abnormal returns on the firm’s decile rank for size, prior year return, 
the book-to-market ratio and the earnings-to-price ratio and use the resulting residual values 
as my measure of risk-adjusted returns. Appendix A includes a timeline of when each of the 
variables in Equation (2) is measured.  
The resulting 1β  coefficient from Equation (2) provides a firm-year specific measure 
of the average correlation between future returns and changes in institutional holdings. 
Positive values of this coefficient indicate that institutions are able to forecast future 
performance and thus provide evidence of informed trade. Since my interest is in explaining 
variation in informed trade, and also to control for extreme observations, I constrain 1β  to lie 
between [0, 1]. I apply this constraint by setting those observations that fall below zero 
(42.1%) equal to zero and those observations that exceed one (0.4%) equal to one, so that 
zero represents uninformed trade and one represents the most informed trading.9 I take the 
resulting value as my primary measure of informed trading by institutions, Informed Trade.10
                                                            
9 The finding that β1 is negative for approximately 42% of my sample is consistent with prior literature [e.g. 
Bushee and Goodman (2007) and Cai and Zheng (2004)] which finds mixed evidence of informed trading by 
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4.2 Measuring Firm-Level Opacity 
Because opacity is inherently difficult to measure, I use five separate indicators for 
the availability of firm-specific information.11
In addition to the number of analysts following a firm, greater accuracy of their 
forecasts also likely reflects greater transparency of the firm’s information environment. 
Lang and Lundholm (1996) suggests forecast accuracy captures both the information 
acquisition activities of analysts as well as the disclosure policies of firms. I use Forecast 
Accuracy as my second measure of firm-level opacity, where lower levels of Forecast 
Accuracy indicate higher levels of opacity. Relatedly, Jin and Myers (2006) shows that the 
extent to which analysts’ forecasts differ from one another (i.e., their forecast diversity) is 
proportional to the standard deviation of hidden firm-specific information. I use Forecast 
 The first is the number of analysts issuing a 
forecast of the firm’s fiscal year earnings, Analyst Following. Lang et al. (2004) provides 
evidence that, in an international setting, analysts play an important oversight and 
information-processing role and thus a smaller Analyst Following is taken to be indicative of 
greater opacity.  
                                                                                                                                                                                        
the average institution. As discussed further in Section 5.4, I conduct several robustness tests, including using a 
Tobit regression approach, unconstrained values of β1 and including only positive values of β1, to ensure that 
the concentration of observations at zero does not affect my results. 
  
10 Because I can identify only one side of each trade, my informed trading measure is subject to several 
limitations. First, by design, it cannot detect institutions’ informed trading against other institutions included in 
my sample. Second, it is unclear how to interpret negative associations between changes in holdings and future 
returns in terms of the extent of informed trade. However, these issues are unlikely to be a significant concern 
as the focus of my paper is on examining potential determinants of informed trading as evidenced by a positive 
association between changes in institutional holdings and future returns. 
  
11 Throughout the remainder of the paper, for parsimony, I omit detailed variable definitions. Detailed 
descriptions of all variables, noted in italics, can be found in Appendix B.  
 
15 
 
Diversity as my third measure of firm-level opacity, where higher Forecast Diversity 
indicates greater opacity.  
Whether or not management chooses a high quality external auditor of its financial 
statements may also provide an indication of the firm’s commitment to financial reporting 
transparency. Prior research such as Teoh and Wong (1993) and DeFond and Jiambalvo 
(1993) suggests ‘Big-5’ auditor oversight is associated with higher quality accounting data. 
Accordingly, I use an indicator variable for whether the firm uses a ‘Big-5’ auditor as my 
fourth measure of firm-level opacity, where absence of a Big-5 Auditor is taken to be 
indicative of greater opacity. 
An extensive literature in accounting shows that firms with earnings that exhibit less 
earnings management are likely to have higher quality accounting and therefore exhibit 
greater transparency. One commonly used class of measures seeks to capture the smoothness 
of the firm’s earnings stream. The idea underlying these measures is that insiders can conceal 
their firm’s performance by reducing the variability of reported earnings through the 
manipulation of accruals (i.e., smoothing). Prior research in an international context, such as 
Leuz et al. (2003) and Lang et al. (2011), suggests greater discretionary earnings smoothing 
is associated with greater opacity. For my final measure of opacity, I use Discretionary 
Smoothing as calculated in Lang et al. (2011).  
4.3 Measuring Country-Level Opacity 
In addition to firm-level measures, I also investigate the relation between three 
separate country-level measures of opacity and the extent of informed trade (country-level 
values for each of these measures are reported in Table 1). Bushman et al. (2004) shows that 
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the lack of a well-developed media communication infrastructure limits the flow of firm-
specific information to interested parties. For my first measure of country-level opacity, I 
follow Bushman et al. (2004) and construct a measure of media development, Media 
Penetration, from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database based on 
newspaper circulation, television ownership and internet connections per capita from 1994 to 
2004. A lower Media Penetration ranking indicates greater opacity. 
For my second measure of country-level opacity, Disclosure, I use a measure of 
financial disclosure requirements from La Porta et al. (2006). A long line of literature, 
beginning with La Porta et al. (1997), documents that country-level required disclosure 
intensity is an important determinant of a firm’s information environment. Lower Disclosure 
scores indicate greater opacity.  
For my third country-level measure of opacity, I use the governance disclosure 
measure from Bushman et al. (2004), Governance. Bushman et al. (2004) shows that the 
quality of a country’s corporate governance infrastructure is an important determinant of 
corporate reporting transparency. Lower Governance scores indicate greater opacity.  
Overall, use of the various firm- and country-level opacity measures allows me to 
examine a variety of aspects of firms’ public disclosure environments. However, it is 
important to note that there are likely to be differences among the measures with respect to 
how the uncertainty they reflect is ultimately resolved. A necessary condition for the 
realization of informed trading profits is that the private information that serves as the basis 
for the informed investor’s position ultimately becomes public and is incorporated into 
prices. Measures that primarily reflect an opaque voluntary disclosure environment, (i.e., 
17 
 
Forecast Accuracy, Forecast Dispersion and Disclosure) as well as those that reflect limited 
information production by outsiders (i.e., Analyst Following and Media Penetration), create 
uncertainty about the firm’s performance that can be resolved through mandated firm-
specific disclosures. Other measures such as Discretionary Smoothing and Big-5 Auditor are 
direct measures of specific ways that a firm can obscure its performance and the quality of its 
reported financial information. It is less clear that firm-specific disclosures can resolve such 
uncertainty. Rather, it is more likely that information obscured by low quality reporting 
becomes public through channels outside the firm itself, such as macroeconomic reports or 
the financial disclosures of industry peers and customers. In an effort to capture each of these 
effects, in the main analyses, I use a future returns window of 90 calendar days, which should 
be long enough to capture both firm-specific disclosures and considerable external 
information revelation.  
4.4 Control Variables 
Prior literature suggests there is more informed trading in smaller, younger, more 
volatile and higher growth firms [Bushee and Goodman (2007); Baik et al. (2010)]. To 
ensure the effects I document are incremental to these effects, I include in Equation (1) 
controls for Size, Firm Age, Return Volatility and Market-to-Book.12
                                                            
12 A firm’s idiosyncratic return volatility could also serve as a measure of information incorporation into price 
[e.g., Jin and Myers (2006)]. For this reason, the predicted sign on Return Volatility is ambiguous. 
 If a firm’s shares are 
rarely traded, it will be more difficult for institutions to exploit private information [Bushee 
and Noe (2000)]. Prior literature has also shown a firm’s liquidity to be an important proxy 
for information asymmetry [e.g., Lang et al. (2011)]. I include Turnover to control for these 
effects. Prior research shows firms with a U.S. ADR have higher institutional holdings and 
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greater transparency [Lang et al. (2003)]. To control for these effects, I include an indicator 
variable for whether the firm cross-lists shares in the U.S., ADR.  
Further, Informed Trade is also likely to be a function of the level of institutional 
holdings. Two competing effects are possible. First, if institutions can profitably exploit 
private information in some firms, they may tilt their portfolios toward such firms. 
Alternatively, because I can identify only one side of each trade, Informed Trade will not 
detect institutions trading against other institutions simultaneously included in estimations of 
Equation (2) and may be decreasing in the level of institutional holdings. I include a control 
for the percentage of institutional holdings, Institutional Holdings, in all analyses to control 
for these effects. Finally, I include country, industry and year fixed effects in all tests using 
firm-level measures of opacity and country, industry and year random effects in analyses 
using country-level measures.  
5. Sample and Results 
5.1 Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics  
I compile data for the analyses from the intersection of the Thompson Reuter’s 
International Mutual Fund (TIMF) and Datastream Advance (Datastream) databases.13 The 
TIMF database reports quarterly firm-level holdings data for over 45,000 global mutual funds 
located in 63 countries from 1999 through 2009.14
                                                            
13 Several prior papers including Hau and Rey (2008), Chan et al. (2005) and Yu (2010) have used, and discuss 
in further detail, the TIMF database.  
 To be included in the sample, I require 
firm-year observations to, at a minimum, have holdings data from TIMF, analyst data from 
 
14 According to a representative, Thomson gathers data both directly from the mutual funds themselves as well 
as from agents of the local authorities. TIMF does not report mutual fund holdings in U.S. domiciled firms. 
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I/B/E/S, and market data to compute the primary control variables from Datastream. I 
exclude any country with less than 100 firm-year observations.  
Table 1 Column (1) provides a breakdown of the sample mutual funds by country. 
Overall, my sample contains data for 42,930 different mutual funds from 42 countries. The 
United States, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom have the largest number of distinct 
funds, while the remaining funds are relatively well dispersed among the other 38 countries. 
Table 1 Column (3) provides a breakdown of the sample firm-years by country. In total, my 
sample contains 43,290 firm-year observations from 38 countries. An advantage of this broad 
international sample is that it is not dominated by the largest most heavily followed 
international firms. As a result, it contains a substantial number of firms for which opacity 
issues are likely to be more pronounced. The substantial variation among the funds and firms 
within the sample should increase the power of my tests.  
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for variables used in the regression analyses. 
Median informed institutional trading (Informed Trade, multiplied by 100 for readability) is 
0.001, indicating that, for the median firm, changes in institutional holdings have a relatively 
small positive association with future returns. In terms of the control variables, the 
descriptive statistics indicate that the sample firms are medium-sized on average and range 
from very large to much smaller firms (Size). The median firm has been publicly-traded for 
almost twelve years (Firm Age), has an annualized volatility of 35.9% (Return Volatility), has 
a market value in excess of its book value (Market-to-Book), turns over its shares about every 
two years (Share Turnover), does not trade shares on a U.S. exchange (ADR) and has mutual 
fund ownership of 8.7% (Institutional Holdings). Looking next at the firm-level opacity 
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proxies, the median firm is followed by four analysts (Analyst Following) and does not have 
financial statements audited by a ‘Big-5’ accounting firm (Big-5 Auditor).  
Table 3 presents correlation matrices for the primary variables of interest, with 
Pearson correlation coefficients above the diagonal and Spearman coefficients below the 
diagonal. Most of the firm- and country-level opacity characteristics are significantly 
correlated (in the predicted direction), which suggests they capture a shared underlying 
economic construct. None of the correlations for any simultaneously included variables 
exceeds 0.53 (between Size and Analyst Following) indicating multicollinearity is unlikely to 
be an issue in the regression analyses.  
5.2 Analysis of Informed Trading by Institutions and Firm-Level Opacity 
My first empirical prediction is that the magnitude of the association between future 
returns and changes in institutional holdings is increasing in the opacity of firms’ financial 
reporting environments. Table 4 presents results for tests of this prediction using five 
separate firm-level measures of opacity. In this analysis, I use fixed effects to hold static 
year-, industry- and country-level factors constant, which allows me to focus explicitly on 
how firm-level variation in opacity within a particular country, industry and year affects 
informed institutional trading.  
In terms of the control variables, I find larger firms (Size) with higher market-to-book 
ratios (Market-to-Book), greater turnover (Turnover) and higher institutional holdings 
(Institutional Holdings) experience significantly less informed trading, while more volatile 
(Return Volatility) firms experience more.  
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Moving next to my primary relations of interest, I find that each of the five firm-level 
opacity indicators are significantly associated with informed trade in the predicted direction 
[Columns (1)-(5)]. Looking first at the analyst characteristics, Analyst Following and 
Forecast Accuracy are both significantly negatively associated with Informed Trade. The 
association between Forecast Diversity and Informed Trade is significantly positive. These 
results suggest that oversight and information acquisition by analysts are associated with a 
decrease in informed trading. Big-5 Auditor is negative and significant, indicating that 
selection of a high-quality auditor is associated with a decrease in private information-based 
trading. Finally, Discretionary Smoothing is significantly positive, indicating that informed 
trading by institutions is greater when managers report earnings that are excessively 
smoothed relative to underlying cash flows.  
Column (6) of Table 4 reports results simultaneously including each of the five 
opacity proxies. To increase the sample size for this analysis, I set missing values of Forecast 
Diversity and Discretionary Smoothing equal to the country-specific median. Analyst 
Following, Forecast Accuracy, Big-5 Auditor and Discretionary Smoothing are each 
incrementally significantly associated with Informed Trade, while Forecast Diversity is no 
longer statistically significant. This result indicates that, although the measures are unlikely 
to be independent (e.g., auditor quality likely influences the extent of discretionary 
smoothing and analyst forecast accuracy), the majority have significant incremental 
explanatory power. Nonetheless, the positive correlations among the variables (see Table 3) 
suggest that each of the five firm-level measures capture a shared underlying construct. For 
this reason, and for parsimony going forward, I combine the opacity measures by ranking 
each variable and summing the percentile ranks to compute an aggregate opacity measure, 
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Firm-Level Opacity.15
Overall, the results of the firm-level opacity and informed trading analysis support 
my first empirical prediction that the magnitude of the association between changes in 
institutional holdings and future returns is increasing in firm-level financial reporting opacity. 
 Column (7) reports results for the aggregate opacity measure, which 
is, as expected, significantly positively associated with Informed Trade.  
5.3 Analysis of Informed Trading by Institutions and Country-Level Opacity 
In the prior analysis, I controlled for fixed country-level effects and showed a positive 
association between firm-level opacity and informed trading. However, the extent of 
informed trading also likely varies based on country-level proxies for the opacity of the 
firm’s information environment. The next analysis provides further tests of my first empirical 
prediction using three separate country-level measures of opacity. 
Table 5 reports the results of the country-level opacity analysis. In this analysis, I 
control for country random effects to ensure that other country-level factors (e.g., GDP) 
which may be correlated with my county-level measures of opacity do not confound my 
inferences. To ensure any potential country-level effects are incremental to the firm-level 
effects documented in Table 4, I also include Firm-Level Opacity as an additional control 
variable. Results for each of the control variables, including Firm-Level Opacity, are 
consistent with the findings in Table 4. In terms of the primary variables of interest, in 
Columns (1)-(3), I find Media Penetration is significantly negatively associated with 
Informed Trade, indicating that information-based trading by institutions is lower in 
                                                            
15 To preserve sample size, I require only that Analyst Following and Forecast Accuracy be available to 
compute the aggregate Firm-Level Opacity measure. If Forecast Diversity, Big-5 Auditor or Discretionary 
Smoothing is missing, the measure captures the average percentile rank of the remaining available variables. 
 
23 
 
countries with more developed media communications infrastructures. In addition, both 
Disclosure and Governance are negatively associated with Informed Trade, which suggests 
that more stringent financial reporting requirements and the quality of a country’s corporate 
governance infrastructure are important determinants of the level of informed trading.  
Again, because the country-level opacity indicators are generally positively correlated 
(see Table 3) and likely capture a similar underlying construct, I combine the measures into 
an aggregate measure, Country-Level Opacity.16
To summarize, the results of this section further support my first empirical prediction 
that informed trading by institutional investors is increasing in the opacity of the country-
level financial reporting environment.  
 Country-Level Opacity is constructed by 
assigning a value of one if a particular country has a Media Penetration, Disclosure, or 
Governance score below the sample median and summing the score for each country. As 
constructed, Country-Level Opacity ranges from zero to three, with three representing 
countries with the most opaque reporting and zero representing countries with the least. 
Column (5) reports results for the aggregate country-level opacity measure, which is, as 
expected, significantly positively associated with Informed Trade.  
5.4 Additional Analyses and Robustness Tests 
In this section, I discuss the results of several additional analyses and robustness tests 
designed to increase confidence in the interpretation of my results. First, to ensure censoring 
of Informed Trade at zero does not unduly influence my results, I estimate Equation (1) as a 
                                                            
16 Because of high multicollinearity among the country-level opacity proxies, I do not estimate their effects 
simultaneously. However, I do address each variable’s incremental importance in Section 5.5.  
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Tobit regression. Column (1) of Table 6 presents results for this alternative specification, 
where I find Firm-Level Opacity remains significantly positively related to Informed Trade.  
Second, to alleviate concerns that the variable’s skewness (caused in part by 
censoring at zero) biases my results, I estimate Equation (1) using the percentile rank of 
Informed Trade. Results for this analysis, presented in Column (2) of Table 6, confirm the 
association between Firm-Level Opacity and Informed Trade is robust to this alternative 
specification. 
Third, to both address the possibility of a risk-based explanation and to increase 
confidence that the documented association between changes in institutional holdings and 
future returns is attributable to trading based on information about future performance, I 
repeat my primary analyses replacing ABHR in Equation (2) with three-day cumulative 
abnormal earnings announcement returns (EACAR3). I use actual earnings announcement 
dates from I/B/E/S (retaining only announcements within one quarter (90 days) of the 
institutional holdings report date) and calculate cumulative abnormal returns during the 
three-day window around these dates. Column (3) of Table 6 presents results using 
EACAR3.17
                                                            
17 Because the reduction in number of observations leads to noisier estimates, for this analysis, Informed Trade 
is winsorized at the 5% level. Results are consistent, but weaker, winsorising at 2.5% or 1%.  
 Although sample size is reduced significantly in this analysis (from 43,290 to 
6,335), reflecting both the limited availability of earnings announcement data for 
international firms and the restriction that the announcement be within one quarter of a 
holdings report, I continue to find Firm-Level Opacity is significantly positively associated 
with Informed Trade. Moreover, the larger coefficient on Firm-Level Opacity (relative to the 
main specification) suggests that a disproportionate share of institutional investors’ private 
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information is revealed during this relatively short window. The short window of the 
earnings announcement returns also provides additional assurance that changes in risk are 
unlikely to drive the observed association between opacity and informed trade.  
Fourth, I consider an Informed Trade measure based on an unconstrained 1β  
coefficient.18 1β As discussed in Section 4, in calculating Informed Trade, I constrain the  
coefficient from Equation (2) to lie between [0,1]. While my primary interest is in 
investigating informed trade, as evidenced by a positive association between changes in 
institutional holdings and future returns, it is possible that variation within the negative range 
of the 1β  coefficient also has meaningful explanatory power. Column (4) of Table 6 presents 
results for this analysis. While Firm-Level Opacity remains significantly positive in this 
alternative specification, the adjusted-R2 decreases, as does the significance of several of the 
control variables, suggesting that the unconstrained 1β  coefficient is not as precise a measure 
of informed trading as is the constrained coefficient. In an untabulated analysis, I also 
confirm that results are robust to excluding negative values of 1β  entirely. 
Fifth, I include a control for bid-ask spread. Prior literature shows that firm-level 
opacity is positively associated with a stock’s illiquidity, as captured by proxies such as the 
bid-ask spread [e.g., Lang et al. (2011)]. To ensure the association between opacity and 
informed institutional trading I document does not simply reflect a correlation between 
Informed Trade and illiquidity, in Column (5) of Table 6, I include Spread as an additional 
control variable. The results show that, although Spread is significantly positively associated 
                                                            
18 Rather than censoring, to control for outliers in this specification, I winsorize β1 at the 5% level. Results are 
consistent, but weaker, winsorising at 2.5% or 1%. 
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with Informed Trade, the Firm-Level Opacity coefficient remains positive and significant, 
indicating that the association between opacity and informed institutional trading is distinct 
from the association between opacity and illiquidity documented in prior literature. 
Sixth, I consider a model including firm fixed effects. The primary firm-level 
analyses include country, industry and year fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the 
firm level, but it is possible other firm-specific factors could be important as well. A concern 
with including firm fixed effects is that several of the opacity proxies (i.e., Big-5 Auditor and 
Discretionary Smoothing) are constructed either over a several year window or change very 
infrequently. Despite the stickiness of the opacity characteristics, results including firm fixed 
effects, presented in Column (6) of Table 6, are consistent with those presented previously, 
providing additional assurance that unmodeled firm-level factors are unlikely to drive the 
observed association between opacity and informed trade.  
Seventh, I consider a changes specification. While the firm fixed effects analysis 
controls for static firm-level effects, an analysis based on first differences explicitly focuses 
on time-series covariation between the variables. As with my primary analyses, I measure the 
change in Firm-Level Opacity one year prior to the change in Informed Trade. Column (7) of 
Table 6 presents results for this analysis. The coefficient on Firm-Level Opacity remains 
positive and significant, providing further comfort that my results are not driven by omitted 
firm-level variables.19
Finally, because it represents a significant portion of the sample (>20%), I repeat the 
prior analyses eliminating Japanese firms. Results (untabulated) are robust to excluding 
  
                                                            
19 Because there is no variation in the change in Firm Age from year to year, I omit it as a control in the firm 
fixed effects and changes analysis.  
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Japanese firms. Moreover, results are robust to excluding any other individual country from 
the sample. In fact, repeating the analysis within each of the 38 countries, the coefficient on 
Firm-Level Opacity is positive in 32 countries [14 significantly (two-tailed); 18 significantly 
(one-tailed)] and is never significantly negative. Repeating the analysis within each of the ten 
years in the sample, the coefficient on Firm-Level Opacity is significantly positive in nine out 
of ten years. Overall, these results confirm the consistency of my primary findings across a 
wide range of countries and time periods.  
5.5 Analysis of Firm- and Country-Level Opacity Interactions 
In this section, I investigate whether firm- and country-level opacity have an 
interactive effect on informed trading. Prior research suggests that while an opaque country-
level disclosure regime can exacerbate firm-level opacity, more extensive country-level 
disclosure regulation and information dissemination can mitigate the effects of poor firm-
level reporting [e.g., Lang and Maffett (2011b)]. To investigate this possibility, as well as to 
assess the incremental importance of the individual country-level opacity proxies, I examine 
the strength of the relation between Firm-Level Opacity and Informed Trade across Country-
Level Opacity groups.  
Table 7 reports results across each of the four separate Country-Level Opacity groups. 
From Column (1), the group of firms with the lowest scores, to Column (4), the group with 
the highest, I find that there is a monotonic increase in the Firm-Level Opacity coefficient. 
Moreover, the Firm-Level Opacity coefficient for the most opaque group of countries is over 
four times larger than (and is significantly different from) the coefficient for the least opaque 
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group.20
In summary, the results in this section are consistent with my second empirical 
prediction and provide evidence of a significant interactive relation between country- and 
firm-level opacity. This interactive effect is interesting because, although it suggests that, 
when combined, firm- and country-level opacity can significantly enhance the ability of 
institutional investors to exploit private information, it also suggests that, even when firms 
maintain highly opaque information environments, regulators may nonetheless be able to 
reduce informed trading through improvements in country-level media penetration, 
disclosure and governance.  
 This finding suggests that, while high country-level opacity may exacerbate the 
relation between firm-level opacity and informed trade, a strong country-level disclosure 
environment can have a significant mitigating effect. These results also confirm the 
incremental importance of each of the individual country-level opacity variables.  
5.6 Analysis of Informed Trading and Opacity by Institutional Type 
In the next set of analyses, I investigate whether the relation between opacity and 
informed trading varies by type of institution. Prior empirical research suggests that certain 
kinds of investors have greater incentives and opportunities to acquire private information. 
Theory suggests private information is both more prevalent and profitable when public 
disclosure is limited. Together these findings suggest that the relation between opacity and 
informed trading will be stronger when the ability of institutions to acquire private 
information is greater. 
                                                            
20 Throughout the paper, assessments of significance across subgroups are based on the p-value (one-sided) 
associated with firm-clustered robust standard errors of the coefficient on the interaction of Firm-Level Opacity 
and the partitioning variable in a fully interacted specification (i.e., I allow each variable, including the fixed 
effects, to vary by the partitioning variable). 
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I use two proxies for institutions’ ability to acquire private information: 1) whether 
the institution is foreign or local and 2) whether the institution has a long or short investment 
horizon. To calculate the extent of informed trading for each category of institution, I use an 
approach similar to the hierarchal linear modeling (HLM) technique discussed in Bushee and 
Goodman (2007). The HLM technique allows the extent to which informed trade is 
attributable to a particular institutional characteristic to be isolated by controlling for other 
institutional characteristics as well as interactions between those characteristics and future 
returns.  
Specifically, to construct a measure of informed trade by type of institutional investor 
I estimate the following regression separately for each of the individual institutional investor 
characteristics (i.e., Foreign, Local, Dedicated and Transient).21
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I take the resulting 1β  coefficient as my primary measure of informed trading for this 
analysis.  
For the first set of tests, I separate institutional investors into the categories of 
Foreign and Local based on whether the institution is located in the same or a different 
country as its target firm. Prior research suggests that local institutions will have an 
                                                            
21 For consistency with the HLM approach as implemented in prior research [i.e., Bushee and Goodman 
(2007)], I model changes in holdings as a function of future returns when estimating informed trade across 
partitions based on institutional investor characteristics. Results are similar if I instead model future returns as a 
function of changes in holdings and account for differences in the variance of changes in holdings across the 
investor type partitions by standardizing the resulting β1 regression coefficient.  
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information acquisition advantage over foreign institutions [Baik et al. (2010); Dumas et al. 
(2011)]. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 8 Panel A present results splitting the sample based on 
Foreign and Local institutional investors. I find the coefficient on Firm-Level Opacity is over 
40% larger for the Local institutional group than for the Foreign group. These results suggest 
that institutions located in the same country as the firms in which they invest are better 
positioned than foreign investors to exploit opaque firm information environments through 
private information-based trading.  
My second measure of an institution’s ability to acquire private information is based 
on the institutions investment horizon. Prior research suggests transient institutions (i.e., 
those that have shorter investment horizons) are more likely to acquire and trade based on 
private information than dedicated (i.e., long-term investment horizon) investors [e.g., Yan 
and Zhang (2009)]. Bushee (2001) characterizes transient institutions as those with high 
portfolio turnover and highly diversified holdings. I adopt a similar approach and identify as 
Transient those institutions in the highest quintile of portfolio turnover and Dedicated as 
those in the lowest quintile. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 8 Panel B present results splitting 
the sample based on Dedicated and Transient institutional investors. The results show the 
relation between Firm-Level Opacity and Informed Trade is nearly five times as large for 
Transient as for Dedicated institutions. These results indicate that institutions with greater 
portfolio turnover profit more from informed trading in firms with high opacity than 
institutions with relatively long-term investing strategies. The fact that the relation between 
Firm-Level Opacity and Informed Trade is stronger for Transient than for Dedicated 
institutional investors also suggests that improvements in firm-level corporate governance, as 
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discussed in Aggarwal et al. (2011) and Ferreira and Matos (2008), are unlikely to explain 
my findings.  
I next investigate the relation between firm-level opacity and informed trade across 
partitions based on both investor type and the country-level information environment. The 
results of Section 5.5 show that the relation between Informed Trade and Firm-Level Opacity 
is strongest when the country-level information environment is also opaque and significantly 
mitigated when country-level transparency is high. This finding, coupled with the results 
based on institution type, suggests that institutions with the greatest incentives and 
opportunities to gather private information may be best able to exploit this information by 
investing in opaque firms that are domiciled in countries with opaque information 
environments. The previous results also suggest that a strong country-level disclosure and 
information dissemination infrastructure may limit the private information-based trading 
opportunities of even the most capable institutional investors.  
Columns (3)-(6) of Table 8 Panel A present results splitting Foreign and Local 
institutional investors into High C-L Opacity (Country-Level Opacity equal to 3) and Low C-
L Opacity (Country-Level Opacity equal to 0) groups. Columns (3)-(6) of Table 8 Panel B 
report similar results splitting the sample by Dedicated and Transient. Because conclusions 
for these groups are very similar, for parsimony, I discuss results only for the Foreign versus 
Local split.  
There are several comparisons of interest in Table 8 Panel A. First, the coefficient on 
Firm-Level Opacity is significantly larger for Local institutions in the High C-L Opacity 
group than for Local institutions in the Low C-L Opacity group. This result indicates that 
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Local institutions are better able to exploit firm-level opacity when country-level opacity is 
also high. Second, the coefficient on Firm-Level Opacity is larger for Foreign institutions in 
the High C-L Opacity group than for Foreign institutions in the Low C-L Opacity group. This 
finding suggests that foreign institutions are more capable of exploiting firm-level opacity 
when country-level opacity is also high. Third, the coefficient on Firm-Level Opacity is 
significantly larger for Local institutions in the High C-L Opacity group than for Foreign 
institutions in the High C-L Opacity group. This implies Local institutions are better able to 
exploit firm-level opacity than Foreign institutions in countries with more opaque 
infrastructures. Finally, the coefficient on Firm-Level Opacity is larger (although not 
significantly) for Local institutions relative to the Foreign institutions in the Low C-L 
Opacity group, implying that Local institutions are better able to exploit firm-level opacity 
even when country-level opacity is low. These results are also consistent with the notion that, 
across both types of investors, a highly transparent country-level information environment 
mitigates the relation between informed trading and firm-level opacity.  
Overall, these analyses are consistent with my third and fourth empirical predictions 
and demonstrate that the interactive effects between firm- and country-level opacity are 
particularly pronounced for those institutional investors with significant incentives and 
opportunities to acquire private information. Moreover, predictable variation in the strength 
of the association between opacity and informed trade across different types of institutions, 
based on the incentives those institutions have to acquire private information, increases the 
likelihood that my findings are attributable to a private-information-acquisition-based 
explanation. Specifically, because these analyses effectively hold the firm constant, potential 
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alternative explanations based on unmodeled firm-specific characteristics, such as 
information risk, are limited and more difficult to envision.  
5.8 Difference-in-Differences Returns Tests 
In the final set of analyses, I use a difference-in-differences design to assess the 
potential economic importance of my main findings. To conduct this analysis, I first, on each 
institutional holdings report date (t), separate firms into deciles based on Firm-Level 
Opacity.22 Then, on each institutional holdings report date (t) and for each of the Firm-Level 
Opacity deciles, I again sort the stocks into deciles based on the total change in institutional 
ownership from reporting period t-1 to t. Next, I calculate the time-series average risk-
adjusted annualized 90-day-ahead return (from t to t+90) for each of the decile portfolios.23 
Then, separately for the most opaque (Firm-Level Opacity decile 10) and the most 
transparent (Firm-Level Opacity decile 1) firms, I calculate the difference in returns between 
firms with the largest increase in institutional ownership (change in holdings decile 10) and 
firms with the largest decrease in institutional ownership (change in holdings decile 1). The 
resulting difference in the change in holdings return spread across opaque and transparent 
firms provides an economically meaningful way to assess differences in the degree to which 
the trades made by institutions across these two groups appear to be informed.24
                                                            
22 Appendix A includes a timeline that details the timing of the measurement of both changes in holdings and 
future returns.  
  
 
23 Returns are risk-adjusted by orthogonalizing the abnormal 90-day buy-and-hold returns with respect to size, 
prior year return, book-to- market and earnings-to-price, as discussed in Section 4.1.  
 
24 It is important to note that a trading strategy based on changes in institutional holdings is unlikely to be 
implementable, as institutional holdings data are made public only with a significant lag. 
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Table 9 presents results for the difference-in-differences returns tests. In Panel A, I 
find that opaque firms with the largest change in institutional holdings earn risk-adjusted 
returns 5.8% larger than firms with the smallest change (p-value 0.01).25
In Panels D and E of Table 9, I compare the change in holdings return spread for the 
most opaque decile of firms (Firm-Level Opacity decile 10) across different types of 
institutional investors. In Panel D, I find that for Local investors investing in the most opaque 
firms the change in holdings return spread is 4.4% larger than for Foreign investors investing 
in those same firms (p-value 0.09). In Panel E, I find that for Transient investors the return 
spread is 4.2% larger than for Dedicated investors (p-value 0.08). These results indicate that 
there is an economically significant difference across types of institutional investors in terms 
of their ability to exploit private information in opaque firms.  
 Looking next at 
Panel B, I find that the change in holdings return spread for firms domiciled in countries with 
the most opaque infrastructures (Country-Level Opacity = 3) is 4.5% (p-value 0.01). Next, in 
Panel C, I simultaneously consider both firm- and country-level opacity. These tests show 
that the change in holdings return spread for the most opaque firms (Firm-Level Opacity 
decile 10) in the most opaque countries (Country-Level Opacity = 3) is 6.5% (p-value 0.07). I 
find that the change in holdings return spread for the most transparent firms (Firm-Level 
Opacity decile 10) is insignificant at the firm-, country- and firm- and country-levels (Panels 
A, B and C respectively). Further, I find that the return spreads across the opaque and 
transparent groups of firms are significantly different (except in Panel C), suggesting that 
institutions are considerably better at predicting the returns of opaque firms. 
                                                            
25 Statistical significance within opacity deciles is based on the p-value (one-sided) of the time-series average of 
the difference in the 90-day portfolio returns across change in institutional holdings deciles. Statistical 
significance across opacity (institution-type) groups is based the on p-value (one-sided) of the time-series 
average of the difference in the difference of 90-day portfolio returns across the partitioning variable. 
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Finally, to provide a basis for assessing the magnitude of the returns net of 
transactions costs, I note that the median bid-ask spread for the most opaque decile of firms 
is 1.1%. While this is over twice as large as the median bid-ask spread for the most 
transparent decile of firms (0.4%), it is still well below the reported return differences. The 
fact that the returns exceed the median transactions costs provides some indication that 
institutions profit from their trading in opaque firms. However, without a measure of the 
institution’s cost of effort in acquiring private information, it is impossible to assess the 
return net of all costs. 26
Overall, the results of the difference-in-differences returns tests indicate that the 
relation between opacity and informed institutional trading is of a sufficient magnitude to be 
economically important. Moreover, this non-parametric approach provides additional 
assurance that my prior results are not driven by the constraints of a linear regression 
specification. 
  
6. Conclusion  
The prior literature examining institutional trading typically focuses on whether, and 
what types of, institutions make profitable trades based on private information about future 
performance. We know significantly less about how the target firm’s public information 
environment affects institutional traders’ ability to earn excess returns. Given their dominant 
role in the financial markets, a thorough understanding of the determinants of institutions’ 
trading behavior is clearly important. This paper contributes to a deeper understanding of 
                                                            
26 Khorana et al. (2009) finds that the total expense ratios for international mutual funds average around 2.0% 
per year. Taking into account the likely magnitude of fees and transactions costs, the return magnitudes I 
document are comparable with Dyck et al. (2011) which documents fee-adjusted annual return outperformance 
for active versus passive institutional investors of approximately 2.5% in international markets.  
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these determinants by examining how financial reporting opacity affects informed 
institutional trading.  
Overall, my results suggest that firm- and country-level features of the public 
financial reporting environment significantly affect institutional investors’ ability to create 
profitable trading advantages. My findings also demonstrate that the extent of institutional 
investors’ informed trading is significantly influenced by interactive relations between firm-
level financial reporting and: the country-level disclosure regime and investors’ incentives 
and opportunities to acquire private information. A difference-in-differences analysis of 
returns earned by institutions across opaque and transparent firms suggests these results are 
economically significant. 
These conclusions are, of course, subject to caveats. Foremost, they do not imply 
causality. However, several features of my empirical design do provide some insight into the 
causal direction of the relation between opacity and informed trade. Foremost, reverse 
causality is unlikely to be an issue in this setting as it is difficult to envision a scenario in 
which higher levels of informed trading by institutions lead to increases in financial reporting 
opacity. Further, the fact that informed trade varies predictably across different types of 
investors and country-level disclosure environments reduces the potential alternative 
explanations for my results. Finally, my empirical results are consistent with the intuition 
underlying prior analytical research. Nonetheless, causal inferences should be drawn with 
caution.  
Second, prior literature finds higher opacity is associated with lower liquidity and that 
lower liquidity can make it more difficult to disguise informed trades. In the main analyses, I 
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control for the indirect effect of liquidity in order to focus on the direct effect of opacity on 
private information acquisition. My findings suggest that, for my sample, opacity does not 
constrain liquidity to such an extent that informed trading is prohibitively costly. However, it 
is important to note that these results may not necessarily generalize to firms where opacity is 
so great that the costs of transacting exceed the value of private information. 
  
38 
 
Table 1 - Breakdown of the Sample by Country 
 
This table presents the country distribution of the sample mutual funds and firm-years during the period from 
1999-2009 with sufficient data from the Thomson Financial International Mutual Fund and Datastream 
Advance databases to estimate the least restrictive specification (Model 1 for Informed Trade in Table 4). 
Following the Datastream convention, I refer to Hong Kong as a country. Any country with less than 100 
observations is excluded. 
Media
Country N % N %  Penetration Disclosure Governance
Argentina 131       0.4% 119       0.3% 76 0.50 68
Australia 533       1.5% 1,751    4.0% 87 0.75 94
Austria 390       1.1% 291       0.7% 90 0.25 79
Belgium 803       2.3% 583       1.3% 83 0.42 76
Bermuda 20         0.1% - - - - -
Brazil 1,824    5.2% 598       1.4% 68 0.25 66
Canada 1,674    4.8% - - - - -
Chile 177       0.5% 253       0.6% 78 0.58 76
China 293       0.8% 666       1.5% 67 - -
Czech Republic 30         0.1% - - - - -
Denmark 387       1.1% 444       1.0% 91 0.58 77
Finland 222       0.6% 648       1.5% 89 0.50 89
France 3,087    8.8% 2,435    5.6% 80 0.75 66
Germany 7,657    21.9% 2,360    5.5% 84 0.42 73
Greece 262       0.7% 635       1.5% 82 0.33 66
Hong Kong 640       1.8% 1,897    4.4% 89 0.92 91
Hungary 8           0.0% 125       0.3% 77 - -
India 535       1.5% 916       2.1% 64 0.92 76
Indonesia 6           0.0% 436       1.0% 63 0.50 -
Ireland 237       0.7% 189       0.4% 80 0.67 92
Israel - - 193       0.4% 79 0.67 66
Italy 1,020    2.9% 1,173    2.7% - 0.67 66
Jamaica 36         0.1% - - - - -
Japan 1,436    4.1% 10,095  23.3% 95 0.75 83
Liechtenstein 101       0.3% - - - - -
Luxembourg 582       1.7% - - - - -
Malaysia 219       0.6% 1,443    3.3% 76 0.92 97
Mexico 162       0.5% 374       0.9% 73 0.58 66
Netherlands 386       1.1% 672       1.6% 91 0.50 86
New Zealand - - 206       0.5% 90 0.67 95
Norway 291       0.8% 646       1.5% 97 0.58 90
Panama 320       0.9% - - - - -
Peru 18         0.1% - - - - -
Philippines 15         0.0% 290       0.7% 67 0.83 66
Poland 84         0.2% 303       0.7% 75 - -
Portugal - - 234       0.5% 83 0.42 70
Singapore 382       1.1% 899       2.1% 90 1.00 100
South Africa 363       1.0% 930       2.1% 65 0.83 94
South Korea - - 711       1.6% - - 78
Spain 4,597    13.1% 808       1.9% 83 0.50 80
Sweden 535       1.5% 1,094    2.5% 91 0.58 97
Switzerland 1,139    3.2% 1,126    2.6% 92 0.67 87
Taiwan 411       1.2% 1,699    3.9% - 0.75 -
Thailand 143       0.4% 610       1.4% 72 0.92 68
Turkey - - 325       0.8% - 0.50 67
United Kingdom 3,885    11.1% 5,113    11.8% 92 0.83 95
United States 7,889    22.5% - - - - -
42,930  100.0% 43,290  100.0%
Funds Firms
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Table 2 - Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics for all firm-level variables included in the regression analyses, 
displayed in the order in which they appear, based on all firm-years between 1999 and 2009 with sufficient data 
to estimate the least restrictive regression model in which the data item is included. All variables are calculated 
as defined in Appendix A.  
Variable N Mean Std P25 Median P75
Informed Trade 43,290  1.932 5.122 0.000 0.001 1.965
Size 43,290  13.757 1.933 12.408 13.547 14.884
Firm Age 43,290  0.172 0.122 0.073 0.142 0.239
Return Volatility 43,290  0.393 0.165 0.271 0.359 0.478
Market-to-Book 43,290  2.371 2.185 1.041 1.673 2.797
Turnover 43,290  0.929 1.172 0.238 0.538 1.099
ADR 43,290  0.128 0.334 0.000 0.000 0.000
Institutional Holdings 43,290  0.131 0.200 0.034 0.087 0.170
Analyst Following 43,290  6.531 6.518 2.000 4.000 9.000
Forecast Accuracy 43,290  -0.029 0.061 -0.022 -0.007 -0.002
Forecast Diversity 33,538  0.045 0.115 0.012 0.029 0.067
Big-5 Auditor 33,538  0.220 0.414 0.000 0.000 0.000
Discretionary Smoothing 32,605  0.467 0.250 0.250 0.475 0.670
Firm-Level Opacity 43,290  0.503 0.157 0.391 0.494 0.607
Media Penetration 39,382  86.341 9.172 80.333 90.000 94.667
Disclosure 41,485  0.710 0.166 0.583 0.750 0.833
Governance 40,061  83.151 10.450 76.450 82.610 93.840
Country-Level Opacity 43,290  1.425 0.986 1.000 2.000 2.000
Spread 29,114  0.012 0.012 0.004 0.007 0.014
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Table 3 - Correlation Matrices 
 
This table reports Pearson correlation coefficients (above the diagonal) and Spearman correlation coefficients (below the diagonal) for variables used in the 
primary analyses. Correlations that are statistically significant at the 5% level (or higher) are presented in bold.  
VARIABLE (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Informed Trade (1) . -0.06 -0.02 0.08 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.06 -0.09 -0.02 0.03 -0.03 0.02 0.09
Size (2) -0.04 . 0.40 -0.23 -0.15 0.07 0.33 0.01 0.53 0.04 -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 -0.27
Firm Age (3) -0.01 0.41 . -0.24 -0.16 -0.02 0.12 -0.03 0.13 0.03 -0.05 -0.10 -0.10 -0.08
Return Volatility (4) 0.03 -0.20 -0.24 . 0.06 0.22 -0.05 0.00 -0.07 0.00 0.07 -0.03 0.02 0.07
Market-to-Book (5) -0.03 -0.12 -0.16 -0.02 . 0.09 -0.01 0.08 0.13 0.07 -0.18 0.00 -0.01 -0.17
Turnover (6) -0.03 0.14 0.03 0.20 0.16 . 0.07 0.15 0.08 0.03 -0.01 0.05 -0.05 -0.07
ADR (7) -0.02 0.31 0.11 -0.04 0.01 0.10 . 0.06 0.33 0.03 -0.06 0.15 -0.07 -0.21
Institutional Holdings (8) -0.05 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 0.25 0.27 0.04 . 0.10 0.00 -0.04 0.08 -0.05 -0.10
Analyst Following (9) -0.06 0.48 0.07 -0.06 0.21 0.17 0.28 0.23 . 0.09 -0.22 0.11 -0.07 -0.56
Forecast Accuracy (10) -0.02 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.09 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.12 . -0.11 -0.06 -0.02 -0.56
Forecast Diversity (11) 0.01 -0.07 -0.03 0.11 -0.21 -0.06 -0.06 -0.13 -0.22 -0.11 . 0.03 0.00 0.62
Big-5 Auditor (12) -0.02 -0.07 -0.10 -0.05 -0.02 0.02 0.15 0.07 0.10 -0.05 0.03 . -0.05 -0.39
Discretionary Smoothing (13) 0.00 -0.06 -0.10 0.01 -0.03 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.02 0.00 -0.05 . 0.44
Firm-Level Opacity (14) 0.05 -0.26 -0.06 0.08 -0.22 -0.16 -0.22 -0.21 -0.64 -0.55 0.61 -0.38 0.43 .
VARIABLE (15) (16) (17) (18)
Informed Trade (1) 0.01 0.03 0.01 -0.02
Size (2) 0.01 -0.08 -0.16 0.13
Firm Age (3) 0.25 0.10 0.07 -0.22
Return Volatility (4) -0.07 -0.04 -0.05 0.08
Market-to-Book (5) -0.05 0.01 0.04 -0.02
Turnover (6) 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.03
ADR (7) -0.09 -0.03 -0.05 0.07
Institutional Holdings (8) -0.05 -0.15 0.01 0.01
Firm-Level Opacity (14) 0.01 0.01 -0.07 0.01
Media Penetration (15) . 0.09 0.37 -0.54
Disclosure (16) 0.02 . 0.49 -0.73
Governance (17) 0.25 0.52 . -0.74
Country-Level Opacity (18) -0.61 -0.70 -0.74 .
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Table 4 - Informed Trading by Institutions and Firm-Level Opacity  
 
This table presents results of OLS estimation of the Informed Trading by Institutions and Firm-Level Opacity 
analysis using firm-level annual observations. In all specifications, Informed Trade (abbreviated IT) is the 
dependent variable. All variables are calculated as described in Appendix B. Robust standard errors clustered at 
the firm level are in parentheses. Country (C), industry (I) and year (Y) fixed effects are included in the models 
as indicated, but I do not report the coefficients. All continuous non-logarithmic variables are winsorized at the 
2.5% level unless otherwise indicated. For the regression analyses, statistical significance is based on two-sided 
t-tests and indicated as follows: *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES Prediction IT IT IT IT IT IT IT
Size (-) -0.080*** -0.226*** -0.171*** -0.174*** -0.231*** -0.101*** -0.167***
(0.029) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.023) (0.030) (0.021)
Firm Age (-) 0.348 0.568** 0.055 0.080 0.797** 0.595** 0.495*
(0.279) (0.282) (0.228) (0.227) (0.347) (0.288) (0.280)
Return Volatility (?) 2.026*** 2.170*** 1.701*** 1.704*** 2.952*** 2.305*** 2.124***
(0.284) (0.284) (0.272) (0.271) (0.341) (0.287) (0.283)
Market-to-Book (?) -0.049*** -0.079*** -0.064*** -0.069*** -0.095*** -0.055*** -0.058***
(0.015) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014)
Turnover (?) -0.068** -0.099*** -0.046* -0.045* -0.116*** -0.064** -0.088***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.024) (0.024) (0.031) (0.028) (0.028)
ADR (-) 0.121 -0.022 0.040 0.038 0.004 0.138* 0.039
(0.075) (0.076) (0.066) (0.066) (0.089) (0.077) (0.076)
Institutional Holdings (?) -1.056*** -1.214*** -0.898*** -0.904*** -1.148*** -1.010*** -1.115***
(0.119) (0.129) (0.108) (0.108) (0.146) (0.120) (0.124)
Analyst Following (-) -0.065*** -0.057***
(0.007) (0.007)
Forecast Accuracy (-) -0.281*** -0.229**
(0.099) (0.101)
Forecast Diversity (+) 0.215** -0.042
(0.099) (0.104)
Big-5 Auditor (-) -0.108* -0.156**
(0.060) (0.070)
Discretionary Smoothing (+) 0.310** 0.208*
(0.130) (0.120)
Firm-Level Opacity (+) 1.839***
(0.207)
Fixed Effects C,I,Y C,I,Y C,I,Y C,I,Y C,I,Y C,I,Y C,I,Y
Observations 43,290 43,290 33,538 33,538 32,605 41,301 43,290
Adjusted R-squared 0.028 0.025 0.025 0.024 0.027 0.029 0.027
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Table 5 - Informed Trading by Institutions and Country-Level Opacity 
 
This table presents results of OLS estimation of the Informed Trading by Institutions and Country-Level 
Opacity analysis using firm-level annual observations. In all specifications, Informed Trade (abbreviated IT) is 
the dependent variable. All variables are calculated as described in Appendix B. Robust standard errors 
clustered at the country level are in parentheses. Country (C), industry (I) and year (Y) random effects are 
included in the models as indicated, but I do not report the coefficients. All continuous non-logarithmic 
variables are winsorized at the 2.5% level unless otherwise indicated. For the regression analyses, statistical 
significance is based on two-sided t-tests and indicated as follows: *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-
value<0.1. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Prediction IT IT IT IT
Size (-) -0.229*** -0.218*** -0.237*** -0.222***
(0.054) (0.052) (0.054) (0.051)
Firm Age (-) 0.736 0.795 0.927* 0.794
(0.513) (0.518) (0.540) (0.506)
Return Volatility (?) 1.508*** 1.453*** 1.427*** 1.409***
(0.319) (0.331) (0.335) (0.325)
Market-to-Book (?) -0.066*** -0.057** -0.059** -0.065***
(0.022) (0.023) (0.024) (0.022)
Turnover (?) -0.100*** -0.106*** -0.060 -0.090**
(0.031) (0.031) (0.041) (0.036)
ADR (-) 0.047 0.072 0.062 0.062
(0.119) (0.112) (0.117) (0.106)
Institutional Holdings (?) -0.820** -0.816*** -0.825*** -0.824***
(0.337) (0.288) (0.283) (0.275)
Firm-Level Opacity (+) 1.465*** 1.462*** 1.461*** 1.397***
(0.190) (0.230) (0.229) (0.226)
Media Penetration (-) -0.078***
(0.012)
Disclosure (-) -3.706***
(0.558)
Governance (-) -0.048***
(0.008)
Country-Level Opacity (+) 0.425***
(0.061)
Random Effects C,I,Y C,I,Y C,I,Y C,I,Y
Observations 39,382 41,485 40,061 43,290
Adjusted R-squared 0.052 0.049 0.048 0.052
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Table 6 – Additional Analyses and Robustness Tests 
 
This table presents results of the Additional Analyses and Robustness Tests using firm-level annual observations. The modifications for each test are 
indicated in the column heading. All variables are calculated as described in Appendix B. Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are in 
parentheses. Country (C), industry (I), firm (F) and year (Y) fixed effects are included in the models as indicated, but I do not report the coefficients. All 
continuous non-logarithmic variables are winsorized at the 2.5% level unless otherwise indicated. For the regression analyses, statistical significance is 
based on two-sided t-tests and indicated as follows: *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES Prediction Tobit Rank Reg. EACAR3 Uncensored Inc. Spread FFE ΔIT
Size (-) -0.287*** -0.006*** -0.344*** -0.064** 0.024 -0.117 -0.516***
(0.036) (0.001) (0.088) (0.026) (0.035) (0.082) (0.140)
Firm Age (-) 0.744 0.010 0.386 0.700** 0.356
(0.462) (0.013) (1.012) (0.336) (0.330)
Return Volatility (?) 2.636*** 0.047*** 1.420 0.437 1.730*** 0.368 -0.539
(0.425) (0.011) (1.061) (0.346) (0.336) (0.279) (0.383)
Market-to-Book (?) -0.068*** -0.001 0.008 -0.003 -0.022 -0.047** -0.041
(0.024) (0.001) (0.051) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.025)
Turnover (?) -0.114** -0.002 -0.109 0.003 0.037 -0.069* -0.017
(0.047) (0.001) (0.087) (0.034) (0.037) (0.039) (0.049)
ADR (-) 0.080 0.004 0.434* 0.046 0.079 0.103 0.282**
(0.138) (0.004) (0.261) (0.093) (0.092) (0.144) (0.123)
Institutional Holdings (?) -1.443*** -0.019** -0.974** -0.316** -1.022*** -0.482** 0.061
(0.234) (0.007) (0.447) (0.137) (0.136) (0.198) (0.152)
Spread (+) 0.612***
(0.069)
Firm-Level Opacity (+) 2.950*** 0.055*** 2.306*** 1.027*** 1.667*** 0.963*** 0.609**
(0.336) (0.009) (0.786) (0.258) (0.250) (0.228) (0.250)
Fixed Effects C,I,Y C,I,Y C,I,Y C,I,Y C,I,Y F,Y C,I,Y
Observations 43,290 43,290 6,335 43,290 28,968 43,290 33,517
Adjusted R-squared 0.006 0.048 0.002 0.033 0.163 0.005
Pseudo R-squared 0.004
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Table 7 – Firm- and Country-Level Opacity Interactions 
 
Table 7 presents results of OLS estimation of the Firm- and Country-Level Opacity Interactions analysis using firm-level annual observations. Results are 
presented for each partition of the aggregate Country-Level Opacity variable. All variables are calculated as described in Appendix B. Robust standard errors 
clustered at the firm level are in parentheses. Country (C), industry (I) and year (Y) fixed effects are included in the models as indicated, but I do not report 
the coefficients. All continuous non-logarithmic variables are winsorized at the 2.5% level unless otherwise indicated. Statistical significance, in the 
regressions, is based on two-sided t-tests and indicated as follows: *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1. Assessments of significance across 
subgroups are based on the p-value (one-sided) associated with the firm-clustered robust standard errors of the coefficient on the interaction of Firm-Level 
Opacity and the partitioning variable in a fully-interacted specification. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Prediction C-L Opacity = 0 C-L Opacity = 1 C-L Opacity = 2 C-L Opacity = 3
Size (-) -0.463*** -0.343*** -0.112** -0.198***
(0.039) (0.047) (0.052) (0.060)
Firm Age (-) -0.046** -0.026 -0.042 0.114**
(0.018) (0.024) (0.026) (0.051)
Return Volatility (?) 0.428 0.995 0.494 1.992**
(0.357) (0.699) (0.771) (0.783)
Market-to-Book (?) 2.493*** 1.774*** 1.477** 0.350
(0.530) (0.468) (0.658) (0.626)
Turnover (?) -0.010 -0.027 -0.050 -0.071
(0.059) (0.057) (0.040) (0.062)
ADR (-) 0.216 0.075 0.128 0.218
(0.139) (0.145) (0.138) (0.190)
Institutional Holdings (?) -2.013*** -1.783*** -1.526*** -0.595***
(0.311) (0.395) (0.462) (0.134)
Firm-Level Opacity (+) 0.498 0.722* 1.428*** 2.095***
(0.409) (0.387) (0.370) (0.519)
Opacity Difference (4 - 1) (P-Value) 1.597 (0.02)
Fixed Effects C,I,Y C,I,Y C,I,Y C,I,Y
Observations 16,560 10,429 7,423 8,798
Adjusted R-squared 0.046 0.038 0.021 0.026
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Table 8 – Informed Trading and Opacity by Institutional Type 
 
  
Panel A: Foreign vs. Local
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Foreign Foreign Local Local
VARIABLES Prediction Foreign Local Low C-L Opacity High C-L Opacity Low C-L Opacity High C-L Opacity
Size (-) -0.449*** -0.771*** -0.444*** -0.385*** -0.509*** -0.712***
(0.016) (0.034) (0.026) (0.030) (0.038) (0.078)
Firm Age (-) -0.085*** -0.201*** -0.081*** -0.102*** -0.109*** -0.209***
(0.009) (0.018) (0.014) (0.021) (0.020) (0.049)
Return Volatility (?) -0.293* 0.079 -0.324 -0.679* -0.137 -2.302**
(0.169) (0.353) (0.245) (0.374) (0.341) (1.063)
Market-to-Book (?) -0.768*** -0.714* -0.836*** -0.334 0.577 -1.182
(0.178) (0.368) (0.289) (0.403) (0.401) (0.958)
Turnover (+) 0.069*** 0.081* 0.074** 0.088 -0.053 0.057
(0.020) (0.048) (0.029) (0.056) (0.041) (0.142)
ADR (-) -0.079* 0.076 -0.085 -0.273*** -0.041 0.729**
(0.043) (0.124) (0.060) (0.090) (0.079) (0.311)
Institutional Holdings (?) 0.637*** 1.918*** 0.213 1.012*** 0.452 3.581***
(0.141) (0.419) (0.330) (0.185) (0.359) (0.594)
Firm-Level Opacity (+) 1.181*** 1.663*** 0.828*** 1.367*** 1.263*** 2.692***
(0.150) (0.325) (0.226) (0.336) (0.324) (0.749)
Opacity Difference (P-Value)
Opacity Difference (P-Value)
Fixed Effects C,I,Y C,I,Y C,I,Y C,I,Y C,I,Y C,I,Y
Observations 27,739 33,356 11,590 5,337 14,038 6,161
Adjusted R-squared 0.087 0.064 0.078 0.100 0.053 0.065
0.482 (0.08)
(2)-(1) (4)-(3) (6)-(5)
(6)-(4)
1.305 (0.04)
(5)-(3)
0.435 (0.13)
1.429 (0.04)0.539 (0.09)
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TABLE 8 – (continued) 
 
Table 8 Panels A and B present results of OLS estimation of the Informed Trading and Opacity by Institutional Type analysis using firm-level annual 
observations. Panel A presents results for Foreign and Local institutional subgroups. Panel B presents results for Dedicated and Transient institutional 
subgroups. All variables are calculated as described in Appendix B. Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are in parentheses. Country (C), 
industry (I) and year (Y) fixed effects are included in the models as indicated, but I do not report the coefficients. All continuous non-logarithmic variables 
Panel B: Dedicated vs. Transient
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dedicated Dedicated Transient Transient
VARIABLES Prediction Dedicated Transient Low C-L Opacity High C-L Opacity Low C-L Opacity High C-L Opacity
Size (-) -0.506*** -1.374*** -0.460*** -0.425*** -1.385*** -1.264***
(0.027) (0.060) (0.040) (0.053) (0.099) (0.116)
Firm Age (-) -0.095*** -0.295*** -0.029 -0.147*** -0.234*** -0.345***
(0.014) (0.033) (0.022) (0.030) (0.056) (0.080)
Return Volatility (?) -0.555** -0.150 -0.304 0.122 1.052 -1.379
(0.262) (0.632) (0.354) (0.655) (1.031) (1.312)
Market-to-Book (?) -0.717** -2.192*** -0.885** -0.816 -1.830 -2.900**
(0.302) (0.706) (0.431) (0.631) (1.241) (1.372)
Turnover (+) 0.107*** 0.055 -0.005 0.121 -0.083 0.066
(0.040) (0.071) (0.052) (0.096) (0.137) (0.173)
ADR (-) -0.148* -0.262* -0.011 -0.302* -0.323 -0.351
(0.076) (0.148) (0.093) (0.167) (0.211) (0.365)
Institutional Holdings (?) 1.490*** 1.159** 1.618*** 1.892*** 2.394* 1.125
(0.261) (0.504) (0.618) (0.362) (1.236) (0.711)
Firm-Level Opacity (+) 0.912*** 4.254*** 0.141 1.248** 4.649*** 4.708***
(0.252) (0.573) (0.319) (0.532) (0.904) (1.139)
Opacity Difference (P-Value)
Opacity Difference (P-Value)
Fixed Effects C,I,Y C,I,Y C,I,Y C,I,Y C,I,Y C,I,Y
Observations 22,880 22,243 9,835 4,348 9,015 4,531
Adjusted R-squared 0.067 0.066 0.059 0.074 0.065 0.071
4.507 (0.00) 3.460 (0.00)
(5)-(3) (6)-(4)
3.342 (0.00) 1.106 (0.03) 0.059 (0.43)
(2)-(1) (4)-(3) (6)-(5)
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are winsorized at the 2.5% level unless otherwise indicated. Statistical significance, in the regressions, is based on two-sided t-tests and indicated as follows: 
*** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1. Assessments of significance across subgroups are based on the p-value (one-sided) associated with the 
firm-clustered robust standard errors of the coefficient on the interaction of Firm-Level Opacity and the partitioning variable in a fully-interacted 
specification. 
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TABLE 9 – Difference-in-Differences Returns Tests 
 
 
Table 9 Panels A-E present results for the Difference-in-Differences Returns tests. Panel A presents results for portfolios partitioned based on deciles of changes 
in institutional holdings and deciles of Firm-Level Opacity. Panel B presents results for portfolios partitioned based on deciles of changes in institutional holdings 
and Country-Level Opacity, where the ‘Opaque’ firms are domiciled in countries with Country-Level Opacity scores of 3 and the ‘Transparent’ firms are 
domiciled in countries with Country-Level Opacity scores of 0. Panel C presents results for portfolios partitioned based on deciles of changes in institutional 
holdings and deciles of Firm-Level Opacity, where the ‘Opaque’ firms are domiciled in countries with Country-Level Opacity scores of 3 and the ‘Transparent’ 
firms are domiciled in countries with Country-Level Opacity scores of 0. Panel D presents results for portfolios partitioned based on deciles of changes in 
institutional holdings and Foreign and Local investors for firms in the highest decile of Firm-Level Opacity. Panel E presents results for portfolios partitioned 
based on deciles of changes in institutional holdings and Transient and Dedicated investors for firms in the highest decile of Firm-Level Opacity. Statistical 
significance within opacity deciles is based on the p-value (one-sided) of the time-series average of the difference in the 90-day portfolio returns across change in 
institutional holdings deciles. Statistical significance across opacity (institution-type) groups is based the on p-value (one-sided) of the time-series average of the 
difference in the difference of 90-day portfolio returns across the partitioning variable. 
Panel A: Portfolios based on Firm-Level Opacity Panel D: Portfolios based on Investor Location 
ΔHoldings Decile Opaque Transparent ΔHoldings Decile Local Foreign
D10 (High) 0.7% -1.0% Opaque Opaque 
D1 (Low) -5.1% 0.2% D10 (High) 0.1% 0.7%
High - Low 5.8% -1.2% 7.0% D1 (Low) -6.9% -1.9%
p-value (0.01) (0.29) (0.02) High - Low 7.0% 2.6% 4.4%
p-value (0.02) (0.17) (0.09)
Panel B: Portfolios based on Country-Level Opacity 
ΔHoldings Decile Opaque Transparent Panel E: Portfolios based on Investment Horizon 
D10 (High) -0.1% 1.6% ΔHoldings Decile Transient Dedicated
D1 (Low) -4.6% 1.2% Opaque Opaque 
High - Low 4.5% 0.4% 4.1% D10 (High) 1.2% 1.0%
p-value (0.01) (0.40) (0.04) D1 (Low) -3.7% 0.3%
High - Low 4.9% 0.7% 4.2%
Panel C: Portfolios based on Firm- and Country-Level Opacity p-value (0.02) (0.37) (0.08)
ΔHoldings Decile Opaque Transparent 
D10 (High) 0.5% 2.8%
D1 (Low) -6.0% 1.5%
High - Low 6.5% 1.3% 5.2%
p-value (0.07) (0.37) (0.13)
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Appendix A. Timeline for variable measurement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
t-1-90 t-1 t t+90 
Past Return 
ABHRi,t-1-90 
  
Current Return 
ABHRi,t 
  
Future Return 
ABHRi,t+90 
  
∆IHj,i,t 
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Appendix B. Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Definition 
ABHR the firm’s risk-adjusted buy-and-hold return less the buy-and-hold return for the 
market in the firm’s country of domicile, where the risk-adjusted return is the 
residual value from a regression of the market-adjusted buy-and-hold return on the 
firm’s decile rank of Market Value of Equity, Book-to-Market, E/P Ratio and 
Lagged Return, as defined below 
Market Value of Equity the natural log of the market value of equity in U.S.D. (millions) (Datastream item 
MV) 
Book-to-Market book value of common equity (WorldScope item 03501) divided by market value 
of common equity (Datastream item MV) 
E/P Ratio net income before extraordinary items (WorldScope item 01551) divided by market 
value of common equity (Datastream item MV)  
Lagged Return the firm’s buy-and-hold return over the previous 12 months (Datastream item RI) 
IH∆  is the change in percent of total shares held by institution j in firm i from time t-1 to 
t multiplied by 1,000 and winsorized at the 5% level 
Informed Trade  the beta coefficient from a regression of changes in institutional holdings on future 
returns calculated as described in Section 4.1, multiplied by 100 for readability 
Size the natural log of total assets in U.S.D. (millions) (WorldScope item 02999) 
Firm Age the age of the firm in months (Datastream item BDATE) divided by 1,000 
Return Volatility the annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns (Datastream item RI) 
Market-to-Book market value of common equity (Datastream item MV) divided by book value of 
common equity (WorldScope item 03501) 
Turnover is the total annual volume of shares traded over the firm’s fiscal year (Datastream 
item VO), divided by the total number of shares outstanding at the end of the fiscal 
year (Datastream item NOSH) 
ADR an indicator variable equal to one if the firm trades on a U.S. exchange during the 
year, and zero otherwise (data are hand-collected from a variety of sources 
including the Bank of New York, Citibank, JP Morgan and Datastream) 
Institutional Holdings the firm’s total shares held by institutions in the TIMF database, divided by the 
total number of shares outstanding (Datastream item NOSH) at the end of the 
calendar year 
Analyst Following the number of unique analysts making a forecast of the firm’s annual earnings, 
obtained from the I/B/E/S Summary File 
Forecast Accuracy the percentile-ranked residual value from a regression of Raw Accuracy on 
Earnings Surprise and Forecast Bias, where Raw Accuracy is the absolute value of 
the forecast error multiplied by -1, scaled by the stock price at the end of the prior 
fiscal year and where the forecast error is the analysts’ mean annual earnings 
forecast less the actual earnings as reported in the I/B/E/S Summary File  
Forecast Diversity the percentile-ranked residual value from a regression of Raw Diversity on 
Earnings Surprise and Forecast Bias, where Raw Diversity is the standard 
deviation of analysts’ forecasts of the firm’s earnings in the following year, 
normalized by the mean forecast and then divided by the square root of the number 
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of analysts following that firm, where all values are taken from the I/B/E/S 
Summary File 
Earnings Surprise unexpected earnings scaled by stock price at the end of the prior fiscal year 
(Datastream item P), where unexpected earnings is defined as earnings per share 
(WorldScope item 05201) less earnings per share from the prior fiscal year 
Forecast Bias the signed value of the forecast error scaled by stock price at the end of the prior 
fiscal year, where the forecast error is the I/B/E/S analysts’ mean annual earnings 
forecast less the actual earnings as reported in the I/B/E/S Summary File  
Big-5 Auditor an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is audited by a ‘Big-5’ auditing firm 
during the fiscal year, and zero otherwise (collected from a variety of sources, 
including historical point-in-time Datastream data and Compustat Global) 
Discretionary 
Smoothing 
the firm’s discretionary earnings smoothing, calculated following Lang et al. 
(2011) 
Firm-Level Opacity the average scaled percentile rank of the variables: (1-Analyst Following), (1-
Forecast Accuracy), (1-Big-5 Auditor), Forecast Diversity and Discretionary 
Smoothing  
Media Penetration is an index constructed from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, in 
which each country is ranked based on the number of newspapers, internet 
connections and televisions per capita from 1994 to 2004 and higher scores 
correspond to better media penetration (the best possible score is 100) 
Disclosure is the disclosure index as reported in La Porta et al. (2006) 
Governance the governance index as reported in Bushman et al. (2004) 
Country-Level Opacity is a country-level index, ranging from 0-3, constructed by summing the instances in 
which a country has a median value of Media Penetration, Disclosure or 
Governance below the median 
Spread the natural log of the median bid-ask spread over the fiscal year, where the bid ask 
spread is equal to (ASK-BID)/((ASK+BID)/2)) 
Foreign is an institution-level indicator variable equal to one if the institution is located in a 
different country than the target firm, and zero otherwise  
Local is an institution-level indicator variable equal to one if the institution is located in 
the same country as the target firm, and zero otherwise 
Dedicated  is an institution-level indicator variable equal to one if an institution is in the lowest 
quintile of portfolio turnover in a particular year, and zero otherwise  
Transient is an institution-level indicator variable equal to one if an institution is in the 
highest quintile of portfolio turnover in a particular year, and zero otherwise 
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